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Resumo
A Resilência das Armas Nucleares de Pyongyang: 
Uma Perspetiva Estrutural
A Coreia do Norte tem prosseguido o seu pro-
grama nuclear militar apesar de unânimes críticas 
feitas por outros atores regionais no Nordeste Asiá-
tico. Tal torna-se especialmente relevante quando 
encontramos duas grandes potências, como os 
Estados Unidos da América (EUA) e a China, nesse 
grupo de atores, respetivamente o principal adver-
sário e aliado norte-coreano. Este artigo explica o 
porquê, apesar das suas posições estruturais supe-
riores, da incapacidade dos EUA e a China em 
ce ssar o programa nuclear norte-coreano, um obje-
tivo partilhado por ambos. É sugerido que no cor-
rente cenário de competição estruturalmente indu-
zido, Washington e Pequim, ainda não foram 
capazes de emitir promessas e ameaças que sejam 
suficientemente credíveis para levar ao desar-
mamento. A resiliência das armas nucleares de 
Pyongyang deve-se ao facto de, devido à ausência 
de promessas e ameaças credíveis, o retorno espe-
rado pela liderança da Coreia do Norte em termos 
de sobrevivência política é maior caso esta man-
tenha armamento nuclear.
Abstract
The DPRK has been able to hold on to its militarized 
nuclear program despite the unanimous criticism of 
other regional actors in Northeast Asia. This is espe-
cially relevant when it comes to the US and China, two 
giants that constitute DPRK’s main foe and ally, 
respectively. This essay explains why, despite their 
vastly superior structural positions, the United States 
and China have not been able to put an end to 
Pyongyan g’s nuclear program, a goal shared by both 
countries. It is suggested that in the ongoing scenario of 
structurally-induced competition, both Washington 
and Beijing have not been able to produce promises and 
threats that are credible enough to lead to disarmament. 
The resilience of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons comes 
down to the fact that, due to that lack of credible promi-
ses and threats, the expected payoff for North Korean 
leadership in terms of political survival is higher if it 
retains its nuclear weapons.
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Introduction
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) Pyongyang has been a stra-
tegic headache for regional actors in Northeast Asia due to its militarized nuclear 
program. It is estimated that Pyongyang possesses between 6 and 10 plutonium-
based weapons with a limited capability of miniaturization and long-range deploy-
ment (Nikitin, 2013; FAS, 2014). Step by step the regime has been able to develop a 
military nuclear program which at least is solid enough to cast the deterring shadow 
of doubt over the governments of other states. Regardless of actually being a paper 
tiger or the real deal, the DPRK is able to politically use its program against other 
states and moreover it constitutes one more damaging exception for the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. Hypothetically, this denuclearization could be achieved 
due to the pressure of domestic actors or due to the constraint by international 
actors. The scenario of domestic-driven denuclearization in the DPRK is highly 
improbable because of the control exerted by the regime, so the most feasible sce-
nario of denuclearization is the one where the Pyongyang is constrained by more 
powerful states. In this structural context, North Korean denuclearization should 
supposedly have been achieved ages ago due to the fact that the most powerful 
unit in the international system – the United States – and the most important ally of 
the DPRK – China – are seeking that outcome. However that was not the case. 
Hence, perhaps the major puzzle regarding the nuclear game of the Korean penin-
sula is Pyongyang’s ability to build and sustain a nuclear program in a context of 
extreme structural weakness in regard to the world’s greatest power and to the 
most formidable rising one.
The United States is DPRK’s most threatening foe and possesses the world’s 
greate st material capabilities, whereas China is Pyongyang’s fundamental ally and 
the strongest native actor in East Asia. In this sense, the question one must ask is 
how a struggling small player like the DPRK could develop a nuclear program 
against a foe with vastly superior coercive power and against an ally whose aid is 
essential for its survival. This brief essay addresses such structural puzzle, thus 
solely exami ning the effects of power distribution and leaving aside the domestic 
dimension of North Korean politics as well as non-structural international factors. 
The essay does not examine the full dynamics of Pyongyang’s denuclearization 
conundrum, it does not present new empirical evidence, and it is far from being a 
description of the evolution of Pyongyang’s nuclear program. Rather, the essay 
focuses solely on a structural analysis that shows precisely why power distri-
bution is a determinant condition in explaining why the DPRK has been able to 
retain its military nuclear program. It is argued that the DPRK has been able 
to develop nuclear weapons because, due to structural incentives that have foste-
red a regional rivalry, the United States and China cannot woo nor coerce it into 
disarmament. On the one hand, the United States is not willing to formally 
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guarant ee the survival of Py ongyang’s regime and China is not powerful enough 
to do it. On the other hand, Pyongyang is aware that the United States is not 
willi ng to fully impose disarmament and that China is not ready to let the regime 
fall for the sake of disarmament. All in all, the resilience of the DPRK as a nuclear 
actor may be explained as a problem of lack of credible promises and threats.
Northeast Asian Structure of Power after the Cold War
Power, treated here as the set of military and economic capabilities of a state, is a 
determinant factor in explaining the relations between the main units in the inter-
national system. This means that the structure of power – the distribution of capa-
bilities among systemic units (Waltz, 1979) – continues to play a fundamental role, 
whether a driving or at least a permissive role in regard to international outcomes. 
The end of the Cold War meant that the United States became unarguably the most 
powerful actor in Northeast Asia but by no means a hegemon – a state powerful 
enough to fully impose its preferred outcomes. North American supremacy in the 
region, at both military and economic levels, was challenged by the fact that Russia 
has remained a nuclear competitor and, especially, due to China’s rise.1
There are many perceptions in the literature about the type of polarity in the curre nt 
international system, perhaps because the old lack of agreement on what consti-
tutes power and on how to measure the number of poles (Mansfield, 1993: 108) still 
persists. Some literature suggests that the system has been unipolar since the 
co llapse of the Soviet Union, simply because the United States is the unit in the 
system that possesses an incomparably overwhelming set of military and economic 
capabilities (Monteiro, 2011/2012: 9). Others talk about bipolarity, mostly in terms 
of the dyad United States-China and with alternatives such as the dyad United 
States-European Union (Dempsey, 2012; McCormick, 2007). Lastly, some literature 
suggests that the international system is multipolar, mostly due to the continuous 
relevance of Russia and the rise of countries such as China and India (Peral, 2009). 
I will not dive into that conceptual discussion in the literature and instead I will 
simply assume that Northeast Asia’s system is a multipolar one skewed towards 
unipolarity. There are three main powers present in the system – China, Russia, and 
the United States – and the latter possesses evidently superior capabilities.
Russia is evidently a player in the region but due to its weak economy and focus 
on Europe it loses regional relevance when compared to China and the United 
States, obviously including its relevance in solving the North Korean nuclear 
puzz le despite the efforts of Vladimir Putin to woo Pyongyang (The Guardian, 
2014). The United States is not a unit native to the system but it is present due to 
1 See military data in IISS and economic data in IMF (1989-2013).
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the alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), signaling its commit-
ment with a robust military presence in those countries. Hence, though not pos-
sessing terri tories in Northeast Asia, the United States is a regional actor and 
surely the most powerful one. The United States possesses the strongest military 
forces in the world and remains by far the country with the highest nominal GDP. 
China is a unit totally “native” to Northeast Asia – with its central territory located 
there – with a strong military deterrence capability that is incrementally being 
improved. Moreover, it possesses the largest population in the globe and a growi ng 
economy that became on par with the American one in terms of Gross Domestic 
Product – Purchasing Power Parity (GDP - PPP). China faces strong domestic 
challen ges and as a result there is uncertainty about its ability to continue rising in 
the future, but what one knows for sure is that Beijing’s current power capabilities 
are vastly superior to those of other native units in Northeast Asia. Therefore, the 
most powerful actors in Northeast Asia are an external unit that remains on top of 
power rankings and a rising native unit that has achieved enormous material 
pr ogress in the last decades.
In this context, the United States has not been able to control political outcomes in 
the region as a hegemon would supposedly do. For example, the political regimes 
in Russia, China, and North Korea remain abhorrent in the eyes of Washington, to 
a greater or lesser extent; regional economic organization is not the one preferred 
by Americans; and, of course, the DPRK has become a nuclear proliferator that 
poses a direct security challenge and contests an international regime that suits 
the foreign policy goals of the United States. Hence, rather than a hegemon, 
Washington is merely an offshore balancer with the fundamental goal of con-
taining China through the bilateral military alliances with Japan and the ROK 
(Mearsheimer, 2006).
In this context of regional multipolarity skewed towards unipolarity, the position of 
the DPRK became one of extreme weakness. The implosion of the Soviet Union 
implied the end of military protection, political support, and economic assistance. 
Moreover, the combination of communism’s loss of legitimacy, the death of Kim 
Il-Sung, crumbling economic structures, and extreme famine, increased the proba-
bilities of regime implosion in the mid-1990s. An alternative to the Soviet Union 
would provide a structural cushion to Pyongyang that permitted to avoid such 
collapse. However, that alternative did not seem to exist in the 1990s because China 
was occupied with its own regime’s problems. It was this scenario that made the 
development of nuclear weapons so essential for North Korean leadership.
The Benefits of North Korea’s Nuclear Program
The basic interest of any political leader is to remain in office – regardless of other 
material or ideational interests she or he may be interested in pursuing – and 
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forei gn policy choices – such as the development of nuclear weapons – are made 
primarily in the pursuit of that political survival, with such choices being affected 
by international and domestic incentives (Lake and Powell, 1999; Bueno de 
Me squita et al., 2003). In this essay I examine precisely the fundamental role of one 
type of incentive – the structure of power. Given the assumption of political survi-
val, the benefits of foreign policy actions should be essentially assessed in regard to 
that goal, not other interests such as raison d’État, political ideology, or morality. In 
this sense, the development of a military nuclear program by the DPRK results 
from the strategic calculation of costs and benefits for its leadership in a context 
where its survival has been threatened (Kim, Roehrig and Seliger, 2011). In a 
nu tshell, all North Korean leaders – Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un – 
have been holding on to their nuclear program because it is a very useful tool to 
maintain their regime alive.
Pyongyang incurred in high costs by developing its nuclear weapons, both in terms 
of trade-offs between domestic allocation of resources and international sanctions. 
Firstly, though the creation of a nuclear force ultimately permits a decrease of 
defense costs in states that seek to keep essentially a defensive posture – opera-
tional nuclear weapons permit a decrease of costs with conventional forces – the 
development of a nuclear program implies a transitional period in which extra 
expenses with a nuclear program co-exist with regular expenses with conventional 
forces. Hence, while it does not possess a fully operation nuclear force, the DPRK 
needs to increase military expenditure and, consequently, decrease the amount of 
resources available to satisfy domestic groups that are essential to keep the regime 
away from implosion. Secondly, the development of nuclear weapons against the 
non-proliferation regime implied international sanctions against Pyongyang, which 
have damaged the country’s already weak economy. Under the current context of 
international politics the DPRK could not hope for a tacit support or a bilateral 
acknowledgment from the United States – as Israel and India, respectively – and 
China is a rising power more interested in stability than in openly revising one of 
the main tenets of international order. Since domestic trade-offs and international 
sanctions were virtually inevitable, Pyongyang obviously developed nuclear 
we apons because the expected benefits of those weapons outweighed those two 
types of costs. To be specific, there have been three main types of benefits: military 
deterrence, economic-political blackmail, and domestic leverage.
In the first place, nuclear forces offer an obvious capability of deterrence to the 
DPRK. By deterrence I mean the potential ability to inflict costs that are higher than 
the benefits of attacking the DPRK. Even if in the current international context there 
is no threat of invasion by the ROK and the United States, the possession of nuclear 
weapons is an assurance that such invasion will not occur in case those circums-
tances change. Pyongyang’s conventional forces surely offer a strong deterrence 
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against the ROK and the United States, given the potential damage they could 
cause in the South and to American forces stationed there. However, there are cir-
cumstances under which those conventional forces could hypothetically become 
unable to serve as deterrence tool. Namely, material could deteriorate; enemy forces 
could become technologically able to prevent Pyongyang’s retaliation; or the poli-
tical decisions of Pyongyang could simply be considered intolerable and prompt a 
military intervention by the United States-ROK, despite the retaliation costs of 
Northern conventional forces. Consequently, the logical step for Pyongyang was to 
build up its deterrence capability by developing nuclear weapons. North Korean 
ability to deploy strategic or tactical nuclear weapons obviously changes the 
calcula tions of Seoul and Washington by heavily increasing the costs of an invasion 
(Ham and Lee, 2013).
If pure strategic calculation were not enough to strongly convince North Korean 
leaders about the utility of nuclear weapons for regime survival, the examples of 
Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine provided evidence of such utility. All these countries were 
associated with nuclear programs that for different reasons ended up disappearing 
and their regimes were ultimately damaged by such disappearance. The cases of 
Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya must have been parti-
cularly frightening for the Kims, but Ukraine also offers a valuable lesson in terms 
of military deterrence. Russia invaded its borders and blatantly supports separa-
tists, a behavior that would be unlikely to occur in case Ukraine had kept its nuclear 
weapons.
Secondly, nuclear weapons also provide benefits in terms of economic-political 
blackmail of countries interested in disarmament. Economic blackmail became 
necessa ry due to the DPRK’s structural economic shortcomings, besides ending 
up compensating for the domestic budgetary trade-offs and for the costs imposed 
by international sanctions. North Korean economy is obsolete, with an estimated 
GDP of 14.4 billion USD and a nominal GDP per capita of 583 USD (UN, 2012). The 
pro blem for Pyongyang is that it is risky to opt for a Chinese-style type of reform, 
recon ciling political authoritarianism with economic openness. The risk derives 
from the fact that, contrarily to China, there is no strong national identity in the 
DPRK and an informed North Korean society might demand Korean reunification 
under Seoul due to socio-economic incentives. Though the lives of the majority of 
North Koreans would surely not be easy in Southern cities, their expectations 
of well-being would be clearly superior in a reunified Korea than in the current 
situation, where only the elite minority in the Songbun system may be said to be 
minimally satisfied. Therefore, rather than implementing the necessary economic 
reforms, Pyongyang has been attempting surgical measures of openness that have 
not produced the necessary effects in terms of economic recovery. Under economic 
despair, illegal activities and economically blackmailing other countries become 
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tempting mechanisms to obtain international revenues. Nuclear weapons increase 
the capability to use the latter mechanism. Since the early 1990s North Koreans 
have been using a cyclical strategy of crisis-reconciliation in order to extract econo-
mic concessions from its neighbors and the United States without actually disman-
tling the nuclear program. The bilateral negotiations with the United States and 
the multilateral Six Party Talks serve as evidence. Despite the fact that its negotia-
ting partners have not always been behaving accordingly to the agreements, the 
DPRK has been actively pursuing a strategy that is supposedly not dependent on 
how the other parties behave. Firstly, a crisis is necessarily generated by progress 
in the nuclear program; secondly, Pyongyang opts for a reconciliatory tone and 
bilateral or multilateral negotiations are conducted in order to extract concessions 
in exchange for the end of the program; thirdly, refusing to dismantle the program, 
North Koreans end up partially or totally defecting in regard to their commit-
ments, preferably after extracting some or all economic concessions negotiated in 
the agreements.
As for political blackmail, it may range from getting support in international forums 
up to a bargaining chip in a scenarios of potential regime change. Let us exemplify 
those ranges in the continuum of political blackmail. In regard to international 
forums, for example nuclear weapons can be used to push Beijing to support deci-
sions that favor Pyongyang, even if intertwined with punishing decisions designed 
to mildly pressure the regime to denuclearize. In respect to a bargaining chip in 
regime transition, one may ask to what extent nuclear weapons can decrease the 
probabilities of regime change driven by domestic factors. Nuclear weapons cannot 
ultimate stop a process of regime change driven by a coup or a revolution but they 
can prevent international incentives for such scenarios and ultimately promote a 
personal bargain for leaders in case of regime change. For instance, the United 
States or the ROK could subsidize an alternative leadership or promote covert 
operations designed to incite popular rebellion but DPRK’s nuclear weapons 
decrease the probabilities of doing so. Specifically, nuclear weapons increase the 
risks involved in such scenarios, since the desperate leadership of a collapsing 
regime – especially if leaders are feeling hopelessly trapped – may decide to use 
those weapons against the ones that are perceived to promote that collapse.
The third benefit refers to domestic political leverage, in which the Kims and their 
entourage have sought to consolidate domestic power by wooing both elites and 
masses with their ability to develop a sophisticated military program inserted in a 
policy of military primacy – Songun (Magalhães, 2013). Though usually examined 
as a monolithic regime, Pyongyang has its own elite power struggles and leaders’ 
office is not taken for granted. Both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il had to deal with 
competition during their tenures. Moreover, as one may infer from existing infor-
mation about the executions of top officials such as Jang Sung-taek, Kim Jong-un’s 
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grip on power is not flawless because purges are still required to consolidate it. In 
this sense, leaders in Pyongyang need to demonstrate to politico-military elites at 
the Workers’ Party of Korea and the Korean People’s Army that they are the best 
solution to provide the private goods essential to them and, consequently, that an 
alternative leader will not fare as well in keeping elites satisfied. To develop a 
milita ry nuclear program against global opposition is surely a demonstration of 
political endurance and astute application of resources, allowing leaders to con-
vince elites that without them the latter’s well-being will likely decrease.
Concerning the masses, the Kims have been using a strategy of control that com-
bines a mythological narrative of political legitimacy with adamant repression. The 
development of nuclear weapons surely fits into the traditional North Korean nar-
rative of wise leaders that diligently strive to equip the country with the tools to 
resist foreign imperialism. In the case of repression, the successful development of 
nuclear weapons contributes to the image of North Korean leaders as powerful 
actors that are also able to successfully deal with any popular attempts of contesta-
tion, hence decreasing the expected utility of potential revolutionaries.
In sum, in a context of structural inferiority, economic-political weakness, and 
necessity to prevent domestic challenges to its authority, leadership in Pyongyang 
found it beneficial to develop nuclear weapons, despite the costs it implied. The 
United States and China have been seeking to dismantle the North Korean nuclear 
program by imposing political and economic costs to the regime with the goal of 
outweighing the benefits of nuclear weapons. These attempts must be examined in 
light of the preferences of Washington and Beijing in regard to the political status 
of the DPRK.
The US and the Rogue Hermit
American policy towards Northeast Asia in general and the DPRK in particular has 
certainly suffered alterations across the administrations of George Bush, Bill 
Clinto n, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama (Cha and Kang, 2003; Pardo, 2014). 
However, I assume that the main preferences of Washington have not been affected 
by leadership change: there may be nuances but the fundamental policy tenets 
remain unaltered. Namely, the presence of the US in Northeast Asia is intended to 
promote three fundamental goals interests. Firstly, the United States aims to pre-
vent the rise of a regional hegemon. Secondly, Washington seeks to politically and 
economically influence its allies. Thirdly, the United States seeks to promote the 
political and economic transformation of states whose institutions are not norma-
tively close to the American ones and as a result extend its alliance network. It is in 
this context that the policy of the US towards the DPRK is analyzed here.
The United States would ideally prefer that the DPRK vanished, but in a gradual 
manner. A gradually unified Korea would simultaneously mean the disappearance 
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of a rogue hermit regime that posed challenges to the United States and the streng-
thening of a valuable ally. To be specific, the optimal scenario in respect to the DPRK 
would be a gradual absorption by the South that resulted in the military, political, 
and economic expansion of American interests in the region. In this ideal scenario, 
Washington would witness the disappearance of North Korean nuclear weapons 
and be able to deploy its forces up to the borders of China and Russia; the disappea-
rance of a formally communist regime would politically delegitimize the Chinese 
political model; and a gradual absorption would imply a minimization of reunifica-
tion costs along with investment opportunities in the Northern part of the penin-
sula, both in terms of material and human resources.
The existence of a rogue North Korean regime is not totally negative for the US, 
since it helps Washington to legitimize its military presence in the region and, 
conse quently, to promote its regional goals. This strategic usefulness, along with 
the short term costs of a Korean reunification, was enough to surpass the benefits of 
Pyongyang’s sudden collapse. However, the development of nuclear weapons has 
certainly increased the benefits of regime collapse and opinions favoring such 
scena rio have increased (Terry, 2014; Haass, 2014). The North Korean regime is 
obviously not a necessary condition to justify American presence in Northeast Asia, 
in the same sense that NATO remained present in Europe despite the fall of the 
Soviet Union. All in all, the DPRK is still tolerable and Washington continues to 
prefer a scenario of gradual absorption of the North by the South, but a sudden 
collap se would not be a disaster for American interests in the region. This means 
that the highest valued preference of the US is a scenario of DPRK’s gradual absorp-
tion by Seoul, followed by sudden regime collapse, status quo, and pro-Pyongyang 
reunification.
The fact that absorption is the highest valued preference does not mean that the 
United States is going to actively pursue it. In fact, the current policy of the United 
States – “strategic patience” – may be said to be one that favors political status quo 
more than gradual absorption or sudden collapse. Gradual absorption would be 
achieved by actively stimulating or forcing political, social, and economic open-
ness, whereas sudden collapse would be promoted through military interventions, 
covert actions, or imposed isolation. In practice, Obama’s strategic patience is not 
actively contributing to any of the two scenarios above. This may be explained by 
the simple fact that, due to the expected behavior of other actors, to actively pro-
mote gradual absorption is a risky move that is not likely to work and, on the other 
hand, to promote a sudden collapse implies much more costs than benefits. Gra-
dual absorption is risky because the fall of Pyongyang always implies the possibil-
ity of a conventional or even nuclear last act of desperation in case the process does 
not go according to the program. A peaceful German-type process of absorption – I 
do not consider it a collapse due to the incremental links between the two German 
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states before 1989 – is likely to fail in Korea. Moreover, it would probably not work 
due to China’s support and North Korean ability to survive in quasi-isolationism. 
As for sudden collapse, the risks of military retaliation would be enormous, invol-
ving not only great costs for American forces in the Korean peninsula but also 
unthinkable human and material costs to the ROK – which explains why Seoul is 
obviously not willing to pursue such strategy of collapse. In case the United States 
opted for pursuing such strategy the negative backlash would be enormous not 
only in terms of direct human and material losses but also in regard to the reactions 
of foes and allies. In effect, China and Russia would surely react negatively, whereas 
the ROK and Japan would surely seek to find an alternative to their alliances with 
the United States. For all these motives, the United States has opted for a discreet 
policy that seems more in accordance to regime status quo rather than pro-Seoul 
absorption or regime change, since Washington is putting pressure on Pyongyang 
to disarm without actually threatening its existence. The same weapons that 
Wa shington is seeking to destroy are the ones preventing it from having a more 
active role in promoting absorption or collapse.
China and the Inconvenient Ally
As in the case of the United States, China’s ultimate political goals in Northeast Asia 
translate into specific preferences about the political status of North Korea. I suggest 
that such preferences also remained the same across the different post-Cold War 
le aders – Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping – though the country’s policy 
towards North Korea has suffered alterations dictated by strategic adaptation to 
domestic and international conditions (Duchâtel and Schell, 2013; Rui and Xiaoke, 
2013). The main regional goal of China is hegemony but its leaders have been aware 
that its hegemonic potential is not yet translated into concrete power capabilities and, 
as a result, China’s rise must remain discreet and regional stabi lity must be a priority. 
In this context, I claim that China’s most valued outcome would be the absorption of 
North Korea2, Korean reunification led by Pyongyang, status quo, gradual absorption 
by Seoul, and sudden collapse leading to pro-Seoul reunification. Unfortunately for 
China, the pursuit of the first outcome would encompass prohibitive costs for Beijing 
and the second is extremely unlikely. Hence, Beijing must focus on maintaining the 
status quo rather than gradual absorption and collapse, even if current relations 
between the allies is one of cold suspicion. It is based upon this premise that China 
has been dealing with North Korea’s nuclear program.
The relation between China and North Korea has been fluctuant. Despite the 
statement that they are “close as lips and teeth”, these countries have not always 
2 That absorption would be based upon Chinese historical claims over the kingdom of Koguryo, 
a fundamental polity in the Korean peninsula from centuries 1st BC to 7th AD (Chen, 2012).
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been in the best of terms, as the current relations between Xi and Kim Jong-un 
illustrate. Beijing played a fundamental role in keeping North Korea alive during 
the Korean War but the following decades witnessed a deterioration of their rela-
tionship. Most importantly, during the 1990s China was far from being the 
suppor tive ally that Pyongyang required. Beijing was busy dealing with its own 
political, social, and econo mic challenges and the salvation of Pyongyang was not 
the priority. With the consolidation of its hybrid regime that reconciled political 
communism and economic capitalism, China became able to protect a regime that 
had managed to survive.
Beijing became the essential ally of Pyongyang, providing military protection, 
political support, economic partnership, and material aid. At military level China 
and the DPRK are bound to support each other due to the Mutual Aid and Coope-
ration Friendship Treaty of 1961. Politically, Beijing has played an important 
suppor ting role on behalf of Pyongyang. That role has been illustrated by the major-
ity of Chinese positions at the UNSC. Though China acquiesced in sanctions and 
has vehemently opposed certain policy choices of Pyongyang at bilateral level, the 
bulk of its positions remain pro-DPRK. For example, Beijing has played an essential 
role in blocking increased sanctions and in preventing other damaging dynamics 
from hitting the DPRK. A case in point of the latter case is the recent protective 
behavior of Beijing at the UN regarding human rights violations in the DPRK 
(S engupta, 2014). Concerning the economy, China is the largest partner of the 
DPRK due to its overwhelming weight at the level of trade and investment 
(Duchât el and Schell, 2013: 17-40). Lastly, Beijing is essential in providing material 
aid to Pyongyang. There are is no official data that may quantify that aid with pre-
cision but it has been widely estimated that the Chinese play a fundamental role in 
keeping North Korean economy afloat, especially at the level of energy and food. 
Whether one is talking about direct transfers or subsidized exports, China’s mate-
rial support seems to be fundamental for, at least, regime stability.
In this context, China could in theory produce a fatal blow to Pyongyang’s regime, 
but to do so would be irrational, regarding the preferences of Beijing. Hence, when 
politicians, diplomats, and observers refer that the leverage of the Chinese over the 
North Koreans is limited, it seems more a matter of strategic constraint forced upon 
Beijing rather than its actual capability to coerce Pyongyang. Beijing is simply 
seekin g to maintain status quo, not its preferred outcome but surely the one with 
highest possible payoffs.
Unable to Disarm: Non-Credible Promises and Threats
Having examined power distribution in Northeast Asia and the positions of the 
DPRK, the United States, and China, it is now possible to pinpoint why two giants 
have not been able to prevent or reverse the nuclearization of such a weak actor. 
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Given the preferences and strategies of Washington and Beijing, Pyongyang has 
chosen a policy of nuclearization because its payoffs are superior to those asso-
ciated with accepting their promises or backing down due to their threats. I suggest 
that such calculations are based upon the fact that the promises and threats of the 
United States and China are not credible. On the one hand Pyongyang is aware that 
Washington and Beijing have strong incentives to defect in regard to their promises, 
while on the other hand North Koreans are also aware that both countries have 
strong incentives not to implement the punitive measures with which they expli-
citly or implicitly threaten the DPRK. This means that the DPRK does not trust the 
promises and is not afraid of the threats.
Let us start with the promises. There are two main promises made explicitly or 
implicitly by the United States and China. The first is that Washington will fulfil its 
part of a denuclearization bargain, while the second is that China is willing to mili-
tarily protect North Koreans if they choose to denuclearize. The first promise is not 
credible because it is not in Washington’s interests to fully keep it, while the second 
one lacks credibility because China is not likely to be able to fulfil it.
In the case of Washington it is simply not profitable to keep all promises included 
in a grand denuclearization bargaining. As soon as Pyongyang denuclearized and 
its ability to re-nuclearize became compromised, the United States would lose the 
incentive to make all the political or economic concessions present in a bargain. 
Denuclearization by North Koreans would necessarily be perceived by Americans 
as a sign of weakness and, as a result, would propel the latter to a strategy of pro-
motion of a gradual absorption of the North by Seoul. It would not likely be an 
explicit defection but rather an implementation of promises impaired by second 
tier details or delays, like the implementation of the Agreed Framework of 1994 
illustrates. Moreover, clean concessions would not only reward a regime that mis-
behaved but they would also be an invitation for violations of the non-proliferation 
regime by blackmailing countries. On the other hand a clean defection would also 
be negative, since it would decrease the credibility of the United States as a nego-
tiating partner in processes of denuclearization.
In the case of China it falls short of its promise to offer security guarantees to 
Py ongyang, despite the treaty that binds them. Pyongyang is certainly a useful ally 
and China is interested in deterring an American attack against the DPRK. Ho wever, 
Pyongyang is likely to have extreme doubts about that commitment. China is not 
strong enough to survive a full-blown military conflict with the United States, 
though it would be able to inflict heavy costs to the Americans. In this sense, Beijing 
is only likely to use its military resources against the United States in case an essen-
tial national interest is at stake. Notwithstanding the relevance of Pyongyang, it 
does not feature in the list of top Chinese national interests. During the Cold War 
West Germans had similar doubts about the nature of American commitment in 
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regard to a hypothetic invasion of West Berlin by the Soviet Union, which was basi-
cally an understandable but flawed fear due to the credibility of Washington’s 
commit ment in Europe. China is not a military peer of the United States as the 
Soviet Union was and Pyongyang’s survival is not as relevant for Beijing as the 
survival of West Germany was for Americans. Therefore North Koreans are surely 
right to fear a lack of commitment from the Chinese, whose ability to protect 
Py ongyang from an American military attack is highly limited.
Concerning threats, the United States and China are explicitly and implicitly 
threate ning North Korea with regime collapse as a result of nuclearization. 
Wa shington signals such threat through the coordination of an international 
attempt to isolate the DPRK and, given its capabilities, the United States actually 
constitutes a permanent threat due to its ability to militarily defeat Pyongyang and 
to support covert operations – which could range from assassination of leaders to 
less drastic measures such as the recent supposed interference with the North 
Korean access to the internet (Cheng and Nam, 2014). As for Beijing, it has repor-
tedly been trying to put Pyongyang under pressure by playing the “end-of-support 
card”, reminding North Koreans that China plays a fundamental role in their eco-
nomy. Both threats lack credibility.
Starting with American threats, the one lacking more credibility is the implicit 
threat of a military attack. The United States obviously has the ability to impose a 
military defeat to Pyongyang as a consequence for nuclearization but it would not 
do so due to the abovementioned overwhelming human, material, and political 
costs. Hence, the intention of the United States is clearly not to militarily attack 
Pyongyang as long as certain red lines – such as deployment or transfer of nuclear 
weapons – are not crossed. Secondly, the threat of collapse through international 
pressure lacks credibility due to the closed nature of North Korean economy and 
the protection given by China. The United States claims that the DPRK needs to be 
integrated in the international community in order to survive, since the con-
sequences of international isolation could be devastating for its social-economic 
fabric. However, current sanctions or similar ones are simply not punishing enough 
to drive North Koreans to a socio-economic crisis serious enough to threaten the 
regime. Lastly, the implicit threat of covert operations leading to regime change is 
also not credible due to the lack of political will. As previously mentioned the 
United States is not willing to risk regime collapse in a scenario including North 
Korean nuclear weapons.
As for China, it prefers a nuclear North Korea to a collapsed one, which means that 
Pyongyang is aware that fundamental aid cannot be interrupted. Consequently, 
though Beijing may criticize Pyongyang and even punish it occasionally, North 
Koreans seem to suppose that the Chinese will not push them off the cliff. There 
have been rumors about a temporary interruption of aid after a nuclear test but the 
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likelihood that China will end up playing a game of chicken with the DPRK is low. 
This explains why Chinese are risk-averse in regard to North Korea, whereas 
Americans are relatively risk-taking when it comes to punishing Pyongyang for its 
nuclear program.
Why are those promises and threats not credible? I suggest that the lack of credibi-
lity is fundamentally justified by the competitive Sino-American dynamics gener-
ated by power distribution. The existence of an offshore balancer and a potential 
hegemon implies a grand competition in which the mischievous behavior of smaller 
states may be tolerated for the sake of higher rewards. Washington and Beijing are 
more concerned about their main regional goals – balancing and hegemony, respec-
tively – than with the denuclearization of the DPRK. Regional stability ends up 
being even more valued by the United States and China due to a context of high 
economic interdependence, which means that regime collapse is even less valued 
by both countries. In sum, Pyongyang has been able to walk between raindrops due 
to the strategic space created by Sino-American competition in a context of inter-
dependence that begs for regional stability.
Conclusion
The DPRK’s power is vastly inferior to the United States and China but it has been 
able to develop a nuclear program against their will. The role of nuclear weapons 
in the survival of Pyongyang’s regime cannot be emphasized enough, in terms of 
security, economy, and domestic politics. Since Pyongyang is not able to be inter-
nationally accepted as a nuclear actor, its basic options would either be to disarm 
and be mildly rewarded or to keep the nuclear weapons, be mildly punished, and 
promote regime sustainability in the medium-term. The United States and China 
are not able to produce positive and negative incentives that are strong enough to 
make disarmament more profitable for the DPRK. This means that Washington and 
Beijing are not able to produce credible promises that decrease the sense of fragility 
of Pyongyang’s leadership nor to produce credible threats that make Pyongyang 
feel that keeping the nuclear arms puts the leadership at stake. Consequently, North 
Korean leaders have opted for developing nuclear weapons.
In this context, assuming that the regime of Pyongyang stays in the current state of 
cohesion and that power distribution remains unaltered in Northeast Asia, one 
should conclude that the likelihood of disarmament is low. Unless an unlikely sce-
nario of domestic threat to the regime forces Pyongyang to reach for a grand disar-
mament bargain with its American foe, its Chinese ally, or both, North Koreans are 
not likely to get rid of their nuclear weapons. Obviously, in this case one can su ggest 
that Pyongyang may not disarm because ultimately both the United States and, 
especially, China are not interested in allowing regime collapse and thus they 
would end up intervening even without disarmament. Nevertheless rationality is 
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bounded and, in this scenario of extreme political distress for Pyongyang, the 
pr obabilities for disarmament seem to increase even if that decision would not 
actually be substantially rational, considering particularly the risk-averse position 
of China and resulting propensity to protect the regime’s stability. In fact, in a 
scena rio where leaders face imminent demise but have the opportunity to trade 
short-term costs for long-term ones, one may suppose that their risk propensity 
increases and a bargain will seem a better option. Assuming that Washington or 
Beijing could have a relevant impact in solving the imagined regime crisis, a North 
Korean leader that faces an imminent economic implosion, an internal coup, or 
even a popular rebellion is more likely to opt for a bargain rather than risk waiting 
for favorable foreign decisions that may come late or not come at all, since mis-
calculations may also occur on the other side. However, those three types of sce-
narios seem unlikely. North Korean economy seems to be growing incrementally, 
there are no evident leadership alternatives to Kim Jong-un, and political control 
over masses continues solid.
Therefore the conditions for a grand bargaining seem absent and consequently 
one should expect Kim Jong-un to continue developing the country’s military 
nuclear program. Such development will continue to focus on nuclear material 
and de ployment systems, which implies further testing. Hence, further nuclear 
or missile testing should not come as a surprise, especially in a period where the 
regime has not been able to go back to bilateral or multilateral negotiation tables 
and is under pressure due to human rights violations. On the contrary, those 
tests are the logical corollary of the DPRK’s strategy and solely reflect the ina-
bility of international actors to successfully disarm it, particularly the United 
States and China.
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